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Abstract—Throughout the last 40 years, the security breach
caused by human error is often disregarded. To relief the latter
problem, this article introduces a new class of biometrics that is
founded on processing physiological personal features, as opposed
to physical and behavioral features. After an introduction on
authentication, physiological signals are discussed, including their
advantages, disadvantages, and initial directives for obtaining
them. This new class of authentication methods can increase
biometrics’ robustness and enables cross validation. I close this
article with a brief discussion in which a recap of the article is
provided, law, privacy, and ethical issues are discussed, some
suggestions for the processing pipeline of this new class of
authentication methods are done, and conclusions are drawn.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication and identification are (traditionally)
approached from various angles. For example, encryption
algorithms for communication in computer networks [1], [2],
smart cards and their remote authentication schemes [2],
[3], CAPTCHA [4], but also questions concerning trust,
beliefs and implicit assumptions of users [5], [6]. All these
authentication methods have in common that the user (or
human) is (somewhere) in the loop and, hence, human errors
can occur [7]. As such, the user (or human) can be considered
as a security breach in many systems [8], [9]. However, as
Wood and Banks already denoted 20 years ago with their
article:
“Human error: An overlooked but significant information
security problem” [10]
(e.g., see also [7], [8]). Moreover, it has been noted
that
“. . . we demonstrate the feasibility of security conditions
attached to our definitions, but which are impractical for use
by humans.” [1, p. 52]
To relief this burden, this article proposes a new method for
authentication and identification of people. As such, I hope
to provide ground to tackle the problem, at least, in a part of
the current security frameworks (cf. [8], [9]).
Almost half a century ago, IBM already envisioned the
authentication and identification of persons by machines [11].
IBM posed that this could be realized via:
1) something the user knows or memorizes;
2) something the user carries; and
3) a personal physical characteristic.
From this point on, a new branch of research emerged:
biometrics1 (i.e., using a physical or behavioral personal fea-
ture [12]). This article proposes a new class of biometrics for
authentication and identification purposes using physiological
personal features instead of physical or behavioral ones.
Essentially, biometrics is a pattern recognition chal-
lenge [13]. It can be applied to either verify the authenticity of
a person or identify a person. In this article, I provide concise
definitions for both of them, adopted from [12, p. 2]:
• authentication2: the process of checking the validity
of an identity claim by matching a credential against
a set of reference values; and
• identification: the process of searching the entire set
of possible identities in order to find the right one
matching the measured feature.
In the former case, biometric data of a person is recorded and
compared with that person’s biometric data available (e.g., in
a database (DB)); that is, 1:1 matching. In the latter case, the
biometric data recorded is compared with all biometric data
available, with the aim to identify the person who’s biometric
data was captured [13]; that is, 1:n matching, with n being
the size of the data (e.g., DB). The following definition of
authentication and identification illustrates this:
Ix =
{
In if maxn{D(Ix, In)} < T
Ix otherwise
(1)
where Ix is the biometric data of an unidentified person. In is
the nth sample from the DB. D is a distance metric and T is
a threshold. Note that if Eq. 1 results in Ix = Ix, the person
remains unidentified.
In case of authentication of persons, 1:1 matching is
applied. So, the DB, as depicted in Eq. 1, contains a single
profile. Hence,
max
n
{D(Ix, In)} < T (2)
holds but can be reduced to
D(Ix, In) < T. (3)
1Biometrics is derived from the Greek language, meaning: life measuring.
2Often called verification in biometric literature.
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In practice, a way in between 1:1 and 1:n matching is often
employed. Then, (some) knowledge on the identity of an
unknown person (Ix) is used to enable a query on a subset
(s) of the DB (i.e., s ⊂ n) instead of the complete DB.
In nowadays practice, authentication and identification are
mainly approached as follows [13]:
1) Manual authentication or identification: either
through an object (e.g., ID card, its reader, or a USB
stick) or via knowledge (e.g., personal identification
number, password, and secret questions).
2) Biometrics that distinguishes: i) behavioral attributes
(e.g., signature, keystroke dynamics, mouse gestures,
and gait) [14]; ii) physical attributes such as finger-
print, iris and retina (e.g., see [15]), facial image and
facial thermogram [16], geometrical features of the
face (e.g., ear and nose), and geometrical features of
the hand (incl. vein pattern) and feet; and iii) miscel-
laneous, such as audio-based (e.g., voice), chemical
attributes (e.g., odor), and DNA.
The particular combination of methods chosen is, in practice,
founded on a combination of trade-offs. These can include
level of accuracy, ease of use (or intrusiveness), security (i.e.,
barrier to attack), (public) acceptability, long-term stability,
size, and (of course) costs. Moreover, aspects such as connec-
tivity, compatibility (e.g., ports, operating systems, and CPU),
and speed play are of influence.
Taking manual authentication or identification and
biometric-based authentication or identification as two types
of methods, one can extract a nomological framework on
biometrics. Such a framework can be characterized using the
following dimensions [13]: universality (i.e., all persons should
possess the trait); uniqueness (i.e., the level of discrimination
it provides between persons); permanence (i.e., invariance
or stability of the trait); measurability (i.e., effort related to
acquisition and processing in practice; e.g., to what extent a
person needs to cooperate in obtaining the biometric and in
how far the environment needs to be controlled?); performance
(i.e., the reliability of the biometric); acceptability for the
people; and circumvention (i.e., sensitivity to fraud). These
dimensions can help in making a structured analysis of the
authentication and identification methods needed for a certain
application.
Next, a new class of authentication and identification
methods will be introduced, which rely on physiological
characteristics of persons. First, a concise introduction is
provided on this new class of methods. It is explained how
this new class can be used to validate traditional methods and
how it can enhance their robustness. Additionally, advantages,
disadvantages, and initial directives are provided for this new
class of authentication and identification methods. This article
ends with a discussion in Section III.
II. PROCESSING PHYSIOLOGICAL SIGNALS
Physiological signals (or biosignals) are electrochemical
changes in nerve cells (or neurons), muscles, and gland cells.
These physiological signals spread from their source through
the body to the surface of the skin. Via surface electrodes
attached (or close) to the body surface, signals from a broad
range of sources can be recorded [17]. For example, from
the heart, the electrocardiogram (ECG) can be recorded [18],
[17], [19]; the muscles’ activity can be recorded through the
electromyogram (EMG) [20], [21]; the sweat glands determine
the electrodermal activity (EDA) [20], [21]; and also brain
activity can be recorded, for example, using EEG [17], [6]
and fNIRS [6].
Physiological signal processing is expected to be of signifi-
cant value for authentication and identification purposes. It can
relief problems that can occur with traditional biometrics [13],
[18], [22], [23], [19], [24]; for example,
1) facial image: recording, processing, and matching
remains problematic;
2) movement analysis (e.g., gait): often not possible in
practice; and
3) voice: often, either speech is absent or suffering from
severe distortions.
However, it is not only these problems that illustrate the need
for a new class of biometrics. The steep progress in sensor
engineering throughout the last decade brought the progress
that was needed to use physiological sensors for various
applications (e.g., [25]). Sensors that enable physiological
signal recording have declined in price, have become more
reliable, and can be applied wireless [25]. Next, I will discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of physiological signals as
biometrics. Subsequently, I will provide an initial set of initial
directives for the application of the new class of physiological
signal-based authentication and identification.
A. Advantages
Traditional biometrics can be (conveniently) manipulated;
in contrast, physiological signals are much harder to manip-
ulate. As mentioned, the rapid development of non-invasive
wireless sensors [25] have made them suitable for a wide
range of applications [21], [23], [26]. As such, physiological
signals can act a new class of interfaces (e.g., authentication
and identification) between man and machine.
Physiological signals are known to discriminate among
people, like traditional biometrics do. Moreover, physiological
signals can conveniently be combined with traditional bio-
metrics. So, adding physiological signals into the process of
authentication and identification will increase the chance on
reliable profile and its adequate matching. More precise, this
can provide the following advantages:
1) Increasing robustness: Data gathered via physiolog-
ical signals can be used to verify data gathered via
traditional authentication and identification methods.
Also, corrections can be made on missing or corrupt
data using data extracted from physiological signals.
Last, integration of these sources can be used for
noise canceling.
2) Cross validation: Traditional biometrics can be vali-
dated against physiological signals; that is, constructs
can be mapped to both biometric features and features
extracted from physiological signals in parallel. This
concerns the expression of the relation between phys-
iological signals on the representation of a person’s
characteristic (e.g., their voice and handwriting).
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The added value of robustness and cross validation are ex-
pressed on respectively signal processing and pattern recogni-
tion level and on a conceptual level.
B. Disadvantages
As with all processing techniques, also physiological signal
processing has its downside. Several crucial concerns that limit
both their acceptation and application in practice have to be
acknowledged; see also Section I and [21], [18], [22], [23],
[19]. Some of the most important concerns are:
1) Obtrusiveness of physiological sensors [25];
2) Unreliability of physiological sensors; for example,
due to movement artifacts, bodily position, air tem-
perature, and humidity [25];
3) Many-to-many relationships; that is, multiple physi-
ological signals can (partially) serve as indicators for
multiple traditional biometric features;
4) Varying time windows of physiological signals; and
5) Physiological processes and, hence, their residues
(i.e., the physiological signals are linear time invariant
(e.g., they habituate).
Regrettably, these issues still have not been solved completely.
Hence, a significant additional progress in physiological signal
processing needs to be realized to unveil the true potential of
physiological signals.
C. Initial directives
Physiological signals have been posed to be a promising
new class of authentication and identification methods. How-
ever, as denoted in the closing sentence of the previous section,
significant progress is needed before physiological signals can
truly be exploited as a reliable authentication and identification
class of methods. Undoubtedly, the recording of physiological
signals lies at the core of making them a success. Therefore,
I will present in this section some directives for physiological
signal recording.
So far, there is a lack of a coherent and concise set of
initial directives for obtaining physiological signals outside of
controlled (e.g., laboratory) settings. This can be considered
as one of, if not, the main problem(s) with physiological
signal processing. Both academic and industrial knowledge on
physiological signal processing is scattered and, consequently,
also are its initial directives. Hereby, I introduce a concise set
of initial directives that can help to improve the quality of
physiological signals recordings:
1) The concept validity, specifically:
a) Content validity (i.e., either the agreement
among experts and/or the degree of repre-
sentation of a construct through the signals);
b) Concurrent validity (i.e., determine the reli-
ability of the signal in relation to its ground
truth); and
c) Ecological validity (i.e., operationalize the
context of measurements).
2) Integration of data streams and, subsequently, apply
triangulation.
3) Physical characteristics; for example, type of elec-
trodes (i.e., dry and wet), gel, location of electrodes,
and environmental characteristics.
4) Temporal aspects that need to be acknowledged be-
cause:
a) people habituate and physiological activity
tends to move to a neutral state;
b) physiological processes develop over differ-
ent time windows; and
c) physiological responses are likely to be lay-
ered.
5) Normalization in its broadest sense; that is, applying
suitable corrections to the physiological signals.
These initial directives do not solve all disadvantages men-
tioned in the previous section. However, they can help in bring-
ing physiological signals to authentication and identification
practice.
In addition to the five initial directives mentioned above,
the importance of respecting the rich history on physiological
signal processing needs to be stressed. Please note that phys-
iological signals are already processed since the 17th century.
Regrettably, this rich history is ignored to a large extent; hence,
a vast amount of knowledge remains unused [27].
III. DISCUSSION
This article started with an introduction on the topic of “au-
thentication based on biometric systems . . . ”, which ”. . . has
gained momentum, pushed by smart marketing slogans: au-
thentication based on a personal feature that can never be lost,
stolen or forgotten.” [12, p. 2]. For this purpose, a new class
of biometrics was introduced (see Section II): physiological
signals, as opposed to more traditional approaches to achieving
progress in biometrics. Both advantages and disadvantages of
physiological signal-based biometrics were denoted as well as
initial directives for their application.
One of the advantages of embracing a new class of au-
thentication and identification methods is that such a class can
add data to a person’s profile (see also Section II). However,
this implies that a new class of data that is gathered on the
same objects (i.e., people) increases data traffic, data storage,
and the required investments data mining. This is in particular
the case, as physiological signals are generally recorded at
sample frequencies of 100Hz–1000Hz and, hence, can quickly
generate a relatively large amount of raw data. Moreover, the
current trend is to collect biometrics of more and more people
and, hence, the size of biometric data streams increases rapidly.
Consequently, data reduction becomes even more important
than it already was. This can be realized via the choice of
the physiological signals dimension (as there are many, each
with their own characteristics [21]) reduction, optimal sample
rates, and efficient distance metrics, combined with tailored
data mining schemes.
So far, this article presented physiological signal-based
authentication as some sort of holy grail for security. However,
introducing this new class of authentication methods brings in
its own problems as well. As [28] already denoted: “A couple
of new items of interest are biometric issues and acquisition
trends. The trend toward biometrics is going to lead to new
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threats as their use grows. First there are no governing statutes
protecting our biometric data today. Second, biometrics is
not a silver bullet – the threat will eventually find ways to
compromise it. Finally as we field these systems we will need
to build analytics and security integrated into the design. If we
use biometrics (be it to avoid someone voting multiple times
or registering for government aid under multiple names) we
need to ensure it has been reviewed by folks who think like
malicious hackers not engineers who think about how to make
things work.” (see also [6, p. 266]).
Introducing physiological signal-based authentication also
introduces a new dimension in law, privacy, and ethical issues
(cf. [29]). Law considerations include: i) rules of privacy, ii) the
constitutional background, and iii) privacy under law (includ-
ing physical, decisional, and information privacy) [13, Ch. 18].
Physiological signal-based biometrics differ in multiple ways
from traditional authentication and identification methods; for
example, they need other registration and processing schemes.
Moreover, it should be noted that physiological signals are
a very rich data source and can reveal much more than a
person’s identity. In general, I would like to stress, that it is
of the utmost importance that lessons learned in traditional
biometrics (e.g., face recognition [16]), in wireless technology
in general (e.g., RFID [30]), but also, for example, in (wireless)
healthcare applications [31] should be taken into account.
This article introduced a new class of authentication and
identification methods; nothing more, nothing less. So, the
undeniable conclusion is that there is still a long way to go. The
validity of the position taken in this article should be assessed
experimentally. The stakes, gains, and costs in the landscape
of security are all high and it is hard to forecast what direction
the future will go in. However, given the speed physiological
sensors are broad to daily practice, it seems inevitable that the
new class of physiological signal-based biometrics will settle
among the traditional classes of biometrics.
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